human error by itself or in combination with other factors caused or contributed to more Army aircraft accidents than^ny other factor. In fact, pilot error by itself was a factor in 80 percent of all accidents and cost an average of $58 million per year in terms of injuries, fatalities and aircraft damage. When accidents caused or contributed to by supervisory and maintenance error are added, almost all accidents involve some human-error factor.
What is so striking about the human-error problem is its persistence. The proportion of accidents due to human error has not changed more than 10 percent in any of the last 15 years. "However, in the same time span:
1. The orientation of aviation operations changed from peacetime to combat and back to peacetime.
2. Annual flight time ranged more than 5 million hours from the lowest to the highest year.
3. Annual accidents ranged more than 800 from (he lowest to the fiighest year.
In sum, human error has been a large and stable cause of accidents in a very unstable aviation environment.
Man: Strongest and Weakest Element. The magnitude and persistence of human error as a cause of aircraft accidents might lead one to wonder about the quality of Army aviation personnel. Fortunately, the quality of personnel is not the problem. The problem is that most expect maximum mission performance from the aviation system and place demands on it-accordingly. In truth, however, one or more of the basic system elements will be operating below maximum performance at any given time during the mission and it is this submaximum performance that causes or contributes to accidents.
In almost all instances man is the system element that causes or contributes to accidents by what he does/does not do or can/cannot do. This is true because man is simultaneously the strongest and weakest element in the aviation system. He is the strongest because he can learn, has diverse skills and knowledges, is adaptable and can share his attention between several on-going tasks. These attributes are why he has been made the overall manager and manipulator of the aviation system. He is the weakest because his performance is unreliable, i.e., he cannot perform the same task in the same manner time and time again.
Bis performance is unreliable; because ft is sufejjeet to the influences; off bis wÄliy, varying* p^chofogieali ami physiological) fiHMeatMJHSL Hfe penfemmaaec & ate; «B»-reliaMe because-«if his uaupg-Cranbiiabaetmg ids:; when aaytfoaig goes wf<m § in» tie system,, fie nwst e©»-tinoe fins: normal rasfo; ami sirnuöaneoBsiy career or adijsst for mistakes imposed: era fiüs dWy pesäk» % afli efemems fe tie Asasy aviat&m systtm. fit is mi surprising then that man, whs» has t&e Boast iaafM«tast and demarad&ig role m Ac system» is awdfaMe, at the performance: of Ms duties ami tins «nc&riite performance causes or contributes to mace accidents than the performance of say ether i in the aviation system. Tu« Human-frror Acddsnt. Wfc have seen tint human error results front man's psychological and physiological' Bmitaitiom and his demanding role in the aviation system. The next step is to show «hat causes man's limitations to he exceeded, bis system rote to be overloaded and human-error accidents to result. Figure 1 provides a functional definition of the human-error accident. Items ! through 8 are the basic man-machjne-environment elements of the aviation system. When these elements get oat of tolerance, an overload (item 9) is put on man's system role (item 10) in that he most continue to perform his normal tasks while correcting or adjusting for the abnormal system condition. When this overload becomes too large: oar oceuats at a critical time, man starts making esEors (item 111) in his normal tasks and/or in his handlang of the abnormal system condition. Most of these errors slip by without causing an accident (item 12)., But, when lady luck frowns, the error results in am aeddent ('item' 13) ., It should be emphasized that the overload (item 9) placed on man's role in the system (item 10):
L. M&yc originate with man because of his inherent psycbotogieall (item 1} and physiological (item 8) limitations, e..g.,, distraction and fatigue, or 2. May be imposed on man because of his managoiat/tEo«bteshooting duties, e.g., improper maintenance (item 3) can lead to an overload (item 9) in the form of equipment/vehicle failure that man must correct or adjust for, or 3. May be both imposed on the man and originated by the man, e.g., improper supervisory practices (item 6) may allow personnel to be worked too long or too hard which produces fatigue (item 8) and a system overload (item 9) in the form of a decreased capacity of the man to perform his duties.
In sum, human error results from man's system role being overloaded and this overload can be the fault of man, other system elements or a combination of both. 
PART II
IT MUST BE emphasized that the human-error accident is a definite indication that at least" one element of the Army aviation system is not operating at maximum efficiency. It also must be emphasized that the accident report can be an outstanding source of information about what went wrong, what caused it and what can be done to correct it. Such information can be used to improve the efficiency of operations at unit and higher levels. However, potential benefit of this information "bought" by injuries, fatalities and aircraft damage is tied directly to the quality of the report, that is, how well the accident investigation team identifies, reports and develops recommendations to deal with inadequacies in the Army aviation system. Unfortunately, most reports of human-error accidents leave much to be desired in each of these investigative areas. We will explain here what you, as part of the accident investigation team, can do to help cure the problem by precisely identifying, reporting and recommending remedies for human errors.
Identifying human error.
From 1958 through 1972 accident boards identified pilot error as a factor in 80 percent of all Army aviation accidents. Unfortunately, reports submitted on many of these accidents indicate the boards, after discovering pilot error as a factor, were satisfied to let it go as such because "everybody knows you can't do anything about pilot error." What these boards frequently fail to realize is that some errors are imposed on the pilot and some are originated by the pilot. The causes of both can be traced back to correctable inadequacies in the aviation system, i.e., selection and training, vehicle/equipment design, maintenance, facilities, environment, supervision and changing psychological and physiological states of the man. In other words, accident boards have been more than willing to identify pilot error as a factor but have stopped short of identifying mistakes of others which caused or allowed the pilot to err.
Reporting human error. Unfortunately, even when accident boards properly identify the pilot and nonpilot human errors involved in accidents, many times they fail to properly report the relevant information. For example, instructions to DA Form 2397-1 direct that for personnel cited as a definite or suspected cause factor, DA Forms 2397-8 (personal data) and -9
(psychophysiological/environmental data) should be completed.
However, -8 and *9 forms are almost never completed en nonpilot personnel, e,g" mechanics, maintenance officers, unit commanders, op» erations officers, sifety officers, air traffic controllers, ground unit com' menders, hlfher level commanders, etc. When .9 forms are completed for similar duty positions (e,g" pilot and copilot) in the same accident, accident boards often "score" the accident instead of the person, i.e., the same *9 items are checked for hoih persons although some apply to only one, Many times boards complete a -9 form and, contrary to «1 instructions, fail to complete the -8 form which is the only source of personal and duty* background information to assist in determining why errors were committed, Even when a '8 form ae* companies a -9 form, it frequently is not completed in full. For example, a recent review of -8 information revealed only 41 percent of the items on this form were completed when it was submitted. However, the U. S. Army Agency for Aviation Safety (USAAAVS) must also share the blame for shortcomings in accident report information about human error. For example, TA6UI USAAAVS is now revising the -8 and -9 forms to eliminate items that are of questionable value and add items which will allow accident boards to clearly and accurately report what happened and why it happened for pilot and nonpilot personnel.
Recommending remedies for human errors. The accident report should tell what happened, why it happened and what must be done to reduce the chances of it happening again. Where human error is concerned, most accident reports leave much to be desired in recommending remedies. One of two things usually happens. If "what happened" and "why it happened" information is reported on the -8 and -9 forms, it may not even be mentioned in the findings and recommendations (-2) beyond the fact that human error was a causal factor. Or, if a recommendation is written against human error, it usually states that a certain procedure was not complied with, that it should be complied with in the future and that the facts and circumstances surrounding the accident should be made available to other aviation personnel. What is needed are findings and recommendations that (a) provide a precise statement of the man's task and how it was incorrectly performed, (b) identify each inadequacy in the aviation system that played a role in the accident and explain how it caused or allowed human error, and (c ) state who is to do exactly what to correct each system inadequacy.
From the above discussion it should be obvious that, where human error is concerned, the accident board should concentrate on the man and not on the accident. In other words, the accident board's job is not only to describe the accident but also to describe what part of the man"s job was performed incorrectly, why it was performed incorrectly and what can be done to reduce the probability that others will commit similar errors. For all Army aviation personnel who may at sometime be a member of an accident board, the following information is offered as a means of increasing the ability to identify, report and recommend remedies for human error.
First, when a man's performance of his job deviates from that required by the operational situation and causes or contributes to a mishap, DA Forms 2397-8 and -9 should be completed on this individual. Performance "required by the operational situation" includes that governed by formal or on-thejob training, by regulation, by standard operating procedures or by other directives in the context of the particular operational situation.
Second, the duty positions of personnel whose job performance should be checked for possible contribution to the mishap are listed in the Guidelines for Completion of DA Form 2397-2. It is suggested this task be directed by the flight surgeon with cooperation of experienced operational personnel. For example, if maintenance error was suspected, the flight surgeon would enlist the aid of a maintenance specialist knowledgeable of the type of vehicle/equipment, mission and operational environment involved in the mishap. The flight surgeon is best qualified to detect and report human error factors from information collected jointly with the expert who best understands the job from an operational standpoint. Table 1* presents a list of tasks and task errors which will help in identifying the man's task and how it was performed incorrectly.
Third, once the flight surgeon and operational expert have identified a task which was performed incorrectly and caused or contributed to the mishap, a precise statement of the man's task and how it was performed incorrectly should be written.
Fourth, inadequacies among basic elements of the aviation system which caused or allowed the human error should be determined. Table  2 provides a checklist that can be used to assist in identifying system inadequacies which played a role in the mishap.
Fifth, for each system inadequacy identified, a statement should be written which explains the causal relationship between the system inadequacy and the resulting human error.
Sixth, one or more remedial measures should be selected for each system inadequacy identified. Table 3 is a checklist which will assist in this task. Each remedial measure should be written to clearly state who is to do exactly what to correct the system inadequacy.
Last, this information should be reflected in the findings and recommendations (-2). Specifically, they should indicate (a) the duty position of the person committing each task error, (b) the checklist item and written description of the task error, (c) the checklist item and written description of each system inadequacy that caused or allowed the task error, and (d) the checklist item and written statement of remedial measures for each system inadequacy.
It should be obvious that when the above steps are properly executed and the personal data (DA Form 2397-8) recorded, the human-error portion of the accident investigation will have been completed, including all of the findings * Tables 1, 2 At 1500 hours on 2 March 1974, Operations Oihcei posted an attack helicopter mission in support of a field training exercise (FTX) to be held the following day. However, he incorrectly posted 0830 as the takeoff time instead of 0730. He made this mistake because he was constantly too busy personally scheduling and coordinating all missions in addition to his other duties. He was "spread too thin" because operations was undermanned (the assistant operations officer was also the battalion instrument examiner). The negative impact of this situation on operations efficiency was not recognized by Unit Commander because he did not personally monitor operations and considered undermanning reports by staff officers as "empire building" or excuses to "cover up."
At 1830 hours, Pilot entered operations after an all-day mission to check the next day's schedule. He noted his 0830 KTX mission for the next day but was unable to get a mission briefing because Operations Officer was in a unit staff meeting and Clerk said it would go "on and on."
At 0800 hours on 3 March 1974, Pilot and Copilot completed preflight of AH-1G, SN 6900000, and proceeded to operations for the mission briefing they missed last night.
Pilot had instructed Crew Chief to close and secure the inspection panels and cowlings. Crew Chief was about to secure the last of these (left-side engine and transmission cowling) when Platoon Sergeant asked him to gel an auxiliary power unit (APU) and start another aircraft down the line ASAP. Thinking he would return prior to takeoff, or at least the pilots would finish securing during the final waikaround inspection, Crew Chief departed to get the APU.
At 0805 hours, Pilot and Copilot entered operations and approached Operations Officer who was on the phone. As soon as Operations Officer saw Pilot and Copilot, he put his hand over the phone and told them a mistake had been made in their takeoff time. He gave them a mission sheet with the correct takeoff time, coordinates and a contact radio frequency.
He told them the CO was "having a fit" on the phone because Battalion had been "bad mouthed" by high-level Ground Commander whose FTX was being held up. Thinking they would get the mixup straightened out when they returned, Pilot and Copilot ran back to the flight line, intent only in getting airborne. When they arrived at the aircraft, Pilot handed the mission sheet to Copilot and said he would crank the aircraft while Copilot plotted the coordinates and planned navigation. Caught up in the urgency of the situation and thinking of the map work ahead, Copilot gave his side of the aircraft a quick look as he climbed in. He either did not see the open latches on the transmission and engine cowling or they just did not register in his mind. Pilot saw the rotor was clear and untied, glanced down his side of the aircraft and, thinking everything was O.K., got into the cockpit.
At 0811 hours Pilot began starting procedures without a fireguard because no one was immediately available and time was essential. They hurried through the runup and were cleared into position for immediate departure. On climbout, at about 150 feet and 40 knots, the left-side engine cowling opened, broke loose and struck the tail boom, vertical fin and tail rotor, causing separation of the 90-degree gearbox. The pilots heard the noise and fell a shudder, and the aircraft yawed to the right. Pilot immediately entered autorotation and elected to land on the remaining runway. At about 20 feet, Pilot increased collective to check the rate of descent and simultaneously reduced throttle to establish alignment for touchdown. These coordinated throttle and collective actions failed to align the aircraft with the path of flight. The aircraft touched down in a level attitude at 5-8 knots of ground speed with a 60-degree right yaw. After touchdown, the left skid dug in, the cross tube collapsed and the aircraft rolled on its left side, sustaining major damage. Pilot closed the fuel and electrical switches and both pilots exited the aircraft uninjured and unassisted. There was no postcrash fire. At 0800 hours on 3 March 1974, Pilot and Copilot completed preflight of AH-lG, SN 6900000, and went to operations for a mission briefing while Crew Chief closed the cowlings. At operations they discovered a mistake in their takeoff lime. Takeoff should have been at 0730 hours.
Pilot and Copilot rushed back to flight line, and, because Crew Chief was not there and time was short, cranked without a fireguard. They hurried through the runup and, at 0815, were cleared into position for immediate departure.
At about 150 feet on climbout,-the left-side engine cowling tore loose and struck the tail rotor, causing separation of the 90-degree gearbox.
Due to the low airspeed, Pilot entered autorotation to counter the noseright condition. On touchdown, the aircraft rolled over on its left side, causing major damage. The crew sustained no injuries and exited the aircraft unassisted. There was no postcrash fire. Findings 1. Pilot failed to comply with preflight checklist. 2. Pilot failed to post fireguard in accordance with starting procedures outlined in -10 checklist.
3. Pilot allowed aircraft to touch down with excessiveforward motion for the right-yaw condition. Recommendations 1. Recommend pilots follow prescribed starting procedures and that these topics subject of the next monthly safety meeting.
2. Recommend Pilot receive postaccident checkride with emphasis on simulated antitorque failure maneuvers.
3. Recommend the facts and circumstances surrounding this mishap receive widest dissemination. prellight and be made the This is the typical "everybody-isclean-except-the-pilot" accident report.
By contrast, This analysis was completed by using tables 1, 2 and 3 and following the "how-to-do-it" steps outlined above. It should be noted that job performances of the : unit commander, operations officer and crew chief contributed to the pilot's task error. Therefore, human-error analyses (table 6) were performed on the role of each of these duty positions but are not presented because of space limitations.
From this analytic example, it should be obvious that "pilot-error accidents aren't all pilot," that accident boards can generate and report quality information and that something can indeed be done about "pilot-error" accidents. The objective in requiring full and complete accident information is not to single out any one individual. The objective is to help fulfill Army aviation's responsibility for maximum possible efficiency by squeezing out of each accident all information that can be used to increase proficiency at each duty position;
: ■* 
Explanation
Insure complete preflight inspection performed on AH-lG helicopter.
Performed task inadequately: did not insure left-side engine and transmission cowling was secured prior to flight.
Operations Officer assigned the mission in an angry, urgent manner.
In making assignments., it should be kept in mind that the manner in which the assignment is made can affect the chances for a mission to be successful. Operations Officer should have told Pilot there had been a mistake in scheduling the takeoff time. To preclude any more mistakes, he should have stressed the need for Pilot to take the necessary time, even though the mission was already late, to insure that the aircraft was ready for flight and that he understood the mission before takeoff.
Pilot allowed urgency imposed on him by operations to cloud his judgment: he did not inspect (trusted that Crew Chief had closed and secured as instructed) and cranked without a fireguard.
When faced with unusual/urgent situations, pilots must remind themselves to follow sound, established procedures.
In those rare emergencies where established procedures must be compromised, pilots must carefully evaluate the alternatives and asso- Schools should emphasize to pilots that operation urgency can be as catastrophic as in-flight emergency and train to follow sound accepted procedures in the face of both.
Operations Officer posted incorrect takeoff time because he was too busy to be efficient. He personally scheduled and coordinated all missions, in addition to his other duties because operations was undermanned.
Unit Commander should personally monitor unit personnel. Personal monitoring of operations personnel would have revealed impact that assigning assistant operations officer as battalion instrument examiner had on efficiency of operations.
Through unit level briefings, Unit Commander should assure his staff officers that he has an "open door policy" concerning operational difficulties and that each problem will receive his personal attention according to priority. COMMENTS From gearbox separation until the aircraft finally came to rest, it was found that Pilot's reactions to this emergency were proper and in accordance with the -10 instructions for this situation: (1) Touchdown should be executed in as level an attitude as can be achieved, and (2) ground speed should be as low as possible to minimize the possibility of turnover. Pilot used poor judgment in his decision to execute the so-called "return to target" maneuver, which was not in the planned demonstration flight, and the altitude (400-500 feet) from which, the maneuver was initiated.
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Unit commander-initiate appropriate action against the pilot in accordance with findings of the board. until the middle of November when they arrived in Le-Harve and were flown to Etian Army Post, France. Because of salt-water damage, the aircraft were then grounded until December, at which time the condition was remedied and the USAREUR checkrides were started. Other than the checkrides, most of the flights were "do nothing flights" with little or no training value. .-■ ■ .,>. "' ■ ■ : The unit's arrival at Etian Army Post coincided with, and proved to be the deciding factor in, an antinoise campaign/demonstration led by a local district magistrate. This resulted in more stringent local flight regulations which curtailed night flying, eliminated weekend flying and significantly reduced training flights in the Etian area. This prompted the unit to move to Verdon during 3-14 May 1972to accomplish unit training and complete semiannual flight niinimums. <i Due to noise abatement problems, unit, relocation sites had been under constant consideration since the unit's arrival. Rumors of a pending unit move caused further unrest in the unit.
Repeated testimony by witnesses from the 555th disclosed that no adequate aviation Safety program existed. Although the unit was formed in February 1971, there was no aviation safety SOP and safety briefings were räTe. Witnesses also testified there was great difficulty in obtaining current flight publications, technical manuals and Army regulations. This, coupled with the commander's apparent disregard for regulations, command responsibilities and the advice of the unit safety Officer (e.g., clearing his own flight demonstration and .flying of dependents),■■■ contributed to an unprofessional environment, laxity iri.conformance with regulations and a general sense 1 of apathy within
The unit.mission as given in the TO&E was "to increase the combat effectiveness of the unit to which ■ assigned of attached by the employment of direct aerial, fires in offensive and defensive action." Although a true mission statement, it was not an antiarmor fnisslori, as' understood by personnel within the Unit. The p*evailh^fe^ng within the ünjt'w that there Was ho leaf mission. 
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mission to conduct a flight demonstration and static display for member °f ä French glider club who wanted to get a ele;se look at Jhe AH-JO, This* request was relayed by CPT Planner to the unit commander without reference to the authenticity (legality) of the mission; The flight was approved by, the. unit, commander and was to include: a demonstration of napof-the-earth taeties, normalflight around the airfield and landing near the glider club for a static display.
On 10 May 1912» WO Smith and WO Jone* prefligjhted the AH-l G and found it to be in flyabte ednV dition. They performed the flight a? planed and landed in the vjqinity of thei assemWed,cJut| personnel. Upon completion of the demonstration,, CWO Flier, who had observed the flight fF9m the jlider club area, felt the capabilities of the AH* 10 had npt been fully demonstrated and asked if he could fly thie aircraft for an additional demonstration, WO Jones agreed, CWÖ Flier was the ppot and GWO Ryder was the copilot during this demonstration-(After the mishap, CWQ Ryder stated he was only ballast for the ajycralt,)
Their flight began with two rjght 3^degree hovering pedal turns, followed by a takeoff to the west wntil reaching an altitude of approximately 50 feet, The pilot then made a, sharp right turn and a lqw#vel (50 feet), highspeed (100 knote) pass on, a heading of 120 degrees, within 15 meters, of they crowd. The pijot proceeded 1 mile on this heading and then performed a quick stop maneuver. The aircraft rose to approximately 100 feet above ground level while the pilot was executing a right turn which essentially reversed the heading. The pilot then placed the aircraft into a dive toward the crowd at speeds up to 110 knots at a very low altitude (3 to 5 feet) on a heading of approximately 320 degrees. Passing the crowd, the pilot initiated an abrupt cyclic climb to roughly 400 to 500 feet above ground level, approaching zero knots airspeed and possibly a negative g condition.
This was followed by a 180-degree right pedal turn which, because of an already excessive nosehigh pitch attitude, placed the aircraft in a steep dive of from 50 to 70 degrees 'on a heading of 170 degrees directly toward the crowd. The aircraft remained nose low for approximately one-half of the dive and then rotated upward to a slightly nose-high attitude, remaining in this pitch attitude until impact. Upon impact, the aircraft struck and killed four people. The aircraft slid 420 feet from the point of impact, and the cockpit section eventually came to rest in an upright position. The aircraft was totally destroyed upon impact with a minor postcrash fire resulting. Both pilots were assisted from the wreckage by U. S. Army personnel at the scene and were taken by UH-1 helicopter to an Army hospital. Tfi maintain, Strjpt air discipline regarding regulations and rules governing AH-1G mgneuygp i|m|(|tiprjj8 (TM 55-i5gO-2?l-10) and spectator safety during flight demonstrating (perV Prgfla» S an^ e, section IV, AR 95-1).
Copilot failed to indicate disapproval in accordance with Army aviator's duties (par. 4»4c, Chapter 4, ^8 95*5) even after the pilot had initiated a third unauthorized, unsafe maneuver.
Copilot slated a/.t.er accident that he was only ballast in the aircraft and in no way }V£s associated with the accident, which indicates lack of initiative and motivation.
iUnit can\man,d"e.r should consider performance of copilot and take action necessary to prevent repceu.rreflce.
Lack of specific Army personnel responsibilities in current Army regulations applicable to instances where others violate regulations and/or place the aircraft, crew or others in jeopardy.
Include in appropriate regulations responsibilities for Army personnel to indicate disapproval when others violate regulations or otherwise jeopardize the aircraft, crew or others.
